Or reading one of those crazy book-things, whatever they are, that Vini was talking about earlier.Quote:
Originally Posted by Vidmer
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Or reading one of those crazy book-things, whatever they are, that Vini was talking about earlier.Quote:
Originally Posted by Vidmer
I never said this support was formal or official. From the site you posted:Quote:
Originally Posted by Vidmer
http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontl...itchfield.html
How did you become involved in the Middle East?
"A few days before Christmas, in 1959, Allen Dulles invited me to his office. He was the director of central intelligence. After I spent ten years in Europe being involved in American intelligence, I had returned to Washington, and had joined the Central Intelligence Agency. Allen told me his conclusion that the Soviet Union, after 1955, had redirected its principal strategic interests away from the Stalin effort to take western Europe, and toward the Third World, particularly towards the Middle East. He said that he expected a full effort by the Soviet Union to establish itself physically in the Middle East. He said that the CIA had done a very effective analysis of the vulnerability left in that area by World War II. He proposed that I leave Europe, and go to the Middle East and south Asia. to be responsible for our operations there.
I had a comparable experience in Europe in the ten years after the war, so I found this an exciting assignment. Europe had become extremely stable after the Warsaw Pact. I very enthusiastically went to the Middle East. For ten full years, I was the head of the Middle East operations, starting in 1959. Allen's analysis, detailed to me before Christmas, 1959, turned out to be the reality. The Soviets did pull out all the stops in their effort to take over the Middle East, the Persian Gulf, the Red Sea, the Suez Cannel, and the Arabian peninsula. But in the end, they totally failed to achieve their objective.
By 1959, Iraq was becoming important, because they had gone through one or two revolutions. The conservative monarchy established there by the British had fallen in a coup. Gamal Nassar was extremely active in the Ba'ath politics. We recognized in the Ba'ath. They were probably opposed to Egyptian nationalism, but we thought they were equally opposed to Soviet communism. Aside from that, we had no clear U.S. policy in which Iraq was either central or even very important. The Soviet effort in the Middle East tried to penetrate the Fertile Crescent from Damascus, to Baghdad, toward the Gulf, and through Egypt and the Suez Cannel to the Red Sea. So it was equally important for them to get control in Baghdad. I think the U.S. policy was essentially containment of Soviet efforts there--Baghdad was merely a piece on the board.
In 1961 and 1962, we increased our interest in the Ba'ath--not to actively support it--but politically and intellectually, we found the Ba'ath interesting. We found it particularly active in Iraq. Our analysis of the Ba'ath was that it was comparatively moderate at that time, and that the United States could easily adjust to and support its policies. So we watched the Ba'ath's long, slow preparation to take control. They planned to do it several times, and postponed it.
We were better informed on the 1963 coup in Baghdad than on any other major event or change of government that took place in the whole region in those years. But we did not identify a radical movement within the Ba'ath that would, six months later, stage a kind of counter-coup, and replace the moderate elements in the Ba'ath. That was our mistake--that surprised us."
--James Chritchfield is former CIA Near East Division Chief and was the leading behind-the-scenes architect of U.S. foreign policy in the Middle East during the Cold War. (The cold war was from 1948-1991).
http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontl...s/chalabi.html
Let's go over some of the history, starting with the Ba'ath Party's coup in 1963.
"The United States got scared that the communists were going to take over in Iraq. And they were scared that the Kassem regime was going to permit the communists to have strong influence in the country, and eventually Iraq would be a communist country. So they found a group of officers and civilians in the Ba'ath Party, who fit the United States recipe on how to deal with communism in the Arab world and in the Third World, which is to encourage so-called indigenous, well-organized nationalist forces to oppose Marxism. These people were ideal military officers, organized conspirators, so they worked with them.
They helped them in every way. They sent messages, and passed messages to them, and they permitted them to operate from areas where the U.S. had influence, in Lebanon, in Egypt. They funded them, and provided them with communications facilities. They also provided them with a list of maybe 1,600 names, broadcast over some radio stations, of communists who should be "eliminated." That's what happened. One of the people who had a minor role to play in this was Saddam himself, who was in Cairo at the time.
. . . [So] definitely the U.S. helped them. [And] there's a clear place where the U.S. helped them diplomatically. In 1963, in the spring, there was the most vicious and determined campaign to eliminate the Kurdish rebellion in the north. For the first and only time since the monarchy, Turkey, Iran and Syria worked together to eliminate the Kurdish rebellion. I believe this was coordinated by some United States agencies. The Syrians were even permitted to send a brigade to participate in the massacre of the Kurds.
Because it was a difficult time for the Kurds in spring, 1963, it became very strange that Iraq and Turkey would cooperate with the Ba'ath Party and nationalists against Kurds. And the Shah, was, in fact, helping the Kurds just a few months earlier.
Let's talk about 1968. Was the involvement of the U.S. in that coup as detailed and as significant as with the coup in 1963?
The U.S. role in the coup of 1968 was not as detailed and as determined as its role in the coup of 1963. I think the Anderson episode was overblown. There's a great deal of fantasy and conspiratory theory involved in this, and I don't think Anderson, who was a Republican, had much clout with the Johnson administration. But the United States knew of that one, because the Ba'ath Party spared no effort to try to secure the acquiescence of the United States in their effort. They spared no efforts to try to persuade the Israelis not to block their path. One of the coup leaders, who is now deceased, came to London in February, 1968, six months before the coup. He apparently met with some Israeli military representative here in London, and said to him, if you will not stand in our way in making this coup, we will pull the Iraqi army back from Jordan once we are successful, and they did. . . .
There was some effort by officers through contacts in Beirut to keep the U.S. abreast of this. The deputy director of military intelligence also played some role with some intermediaries with the United States. He was not a sophisticated man. He was a person who had a flair, in Iraqi terms, for appearing secretive and conciliatory, and he was easily manipulated.
So, there were these links. But you see it was not all an even thing, because, by 1968, the massive Arab nationalism was essentially a spent force. Nasser was defeated by the Israelis, and the Arabs were in disarray. Iraq was also in disarray, a weak country--the oil prices were not that high, and there are always the Kurds who could be stirred up. The Shah was much more powerful than Iraq; Iraq was not considered to be a strategic threat.
We've heard from some American diplomats who were active in the 1970s that there was a gradual improvement of relations, from the mid-1970s, and, roughly, onwards--beginning with business contacts, then diplomatic contacts at higher levels. What do you think was motivating that on the American side?
Saddam persuaded the Ba'ath to nationalize the oil companies in 1972. He made a treaty with the Russians, a friendship and cooperation treaty for 15 years. I know there was a western effort to try to make a coup in Baghdad. Some Americans and British people were involved. They asked King Hussein to lead this effort, and, in 1972, did make an attempt. The U.S. also made an attempt with the Kurds, in beginning of 1972. Henry Kissinger met with Barzani in 1972 and promised them help.
King Hussein met with Barzani--unfortunately most of the actors in this drama are deceased, but they did meet--and there was a flurry of activity. Then King Hussein was told by the western powers to desist by the autumn of 1972. This effort was abandoned, because the focus shifted to using the Kurds to put pressure on Saddam--the strategy that was advocated by the Shah. So the focus shifted to Idris Al Barzani. General Barzani gave a very important interview to the Washington Post. He was interviewed in northern Iraq, in Kurdistan, around August of 1973.
General Barzani, at the time, was very forward in seeking U.S. support, and even seeking Israeli support in the effort against the Ba'ath Party. This developed into full-scale open warfare in Iraqi Kurdistan. All kinds of games were played on the Kurds, and their expectations rose, contrary to the wishes of General Barzani. His rebellion was transformed into an exodus of people. He told me that he was weakened by the fact that there were over half a million people who have migrated from their homes in the cities of Iraq.
--Dr. Ahmad Chalabi is part of a three-man leadership council for the Iraqi opposition group, the Iraqi National Congress.
Now leave me alone, I really don't have time for this. ;)
I should have specified I was refering to the post internal coup Ba'ath party of 1963. The Ba'ath party prior to that coup was as your article states was moderate and useful in opposing the Soviets. The Ba'ath party post 1963 is the Ba'ath party we know today. It is akin to refering to the republican party of 1863 as the "same" political party here in 2004. Your Chalabi article shows US support for the Ba'athist party up until 1963. At which point mention of support is missing. This continues until 1968 when they nationalise the oil.
So while we may have provided aid to a party that shares the same name as the Ba'athist party of today, they were fundamentaly different groups.
vanilla is a super ninja when it comes to posting... don't mess with her.
hehe Llain spell MY name right!!!!!!!!!! :p :DQuote:
Originally Posted by Llain
see what i mean? i got owned...Quote:
Originally Posted by Vinilaa