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You'll excuse me if I roll my eyes at your bad mouthing of my country for "not trying hard enough."
Show me one single where I "bad mouth" or even criticize your country.
I am usually very shy to make such statements, knowing almost all the information available to me is not reliable.
Well, you seem to think we killed too many Iraqis, and for our own benefit. Thats not exactly a nice thing to say about us.
The question how many Iraqis killed is not "too many" is really no question I know the answer to. Even more as the "acceptable" number of victims is largely dependent on how the Iraq is going to come out of the current situation (I.e will the next government be better than the last in the long run).Quote:
Originally Posted by Torrid
And you might even note this as criticizsm - removing a dictator, with seemingly not a slight idea what is going to come after him, is in my imagination not the "best" way to do it.
The second part "for our own benefit" - the war was majorly justified by, "Iraq is a danger, the US has the right to defend itself from that danger". That is as much "for our own benefit" as I can think of and not even metioning interrest in the oil reserves (which are...obvious, or not?).
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We will have to disagree on this one. I could see posible arguments for A, B or C but they are all red herrings in my mind for the reasons I have detailed in length above.
You misunderstant me. my point is weather A is true, B is true, or C is true (of course one of the 3 has to be true to one degree or another) the answer is imaterial and the issue of trade is a red herring for reasons I have detailed above.Quote:
If neither a), b) or c) are true, then there has to be a d) as they are mutually exclusive. I'd be surprised if you could name a d) though.
The same way these types of things have always been decided since the begining of human time, the people who have power decide.Quote:
I am all for removing "evil dictators", there are basically at least 2 major points to decide; who defines what makes someone an "evil dictator" and how many people are you allowed to kill in the process.
Well, the last oil import percentages I saw (which came from CNN, which is notoriously liberal) put Iraq at 4% or some small amount like that.
And yes, we do have a good idea who will replace Saddam. We're determined to make a democratic Iraq. We're not about to lose over 500 of our own just to let some other dickhead ruin it all over again.
You misunderstant me. my point is weather A is true, B is true, or C is true (of course one of the 3 has to be true to one degree or another) the answer is imaterial and the issue of trade is a red herring for reasons I have detailed above.
Isn't that the same as b)?
I believe removing trade regulations with those states won't be enough to change the situation. But I am convinced of the opposite, if you don't allow them an equal position in international trade, they won't solve thier problems.
Well, the last oil import percentages I saw (which came from CNN, which is notoriously liberal) put Iraq at 4% or some small amount like that.
Big surprise. For a state without any form of government. Iraq has the second largest oil reserves in the world.
But as I said, it is not substantial. The main reason that was advertised for attacking Iraq, was to protect the US from Iraq and their "weapons of massdestruction". If you think oil had no part in the decision to attack Iraq, you are free to have your own oppinion.
And yes, we do have a good idea who will replace Saddam. We're determined to make a democratic Iraq.
How do you "make" a democratic state, does not "democratic" inherently mean, that the Iraqis have to make their own state. If the Iraqis are not interrested in a democracy, there won't be one.
If I am not mistaken we have "made" a "democratic" state in both Germany and Japan. While you are correct that if the iraqis do not want one it will be tough but we have done it, it is posible. How will we know if there can be a democratic state in iraq if we don't try?Quote:
How do you "make" a democratic state, does not "democratic" inherently mean, that the Iraqis have to make their own state. If the Iraqis are not interrested in a democracy, there won't be one.
The US intelligence community has a very good idea of who will come to power in Iraq when all this is done. Don't for one second believe they are as inept as the press would like you to believe.
Of course they do. They'll PUT him into power, finance him and supply him with weapons. Just like the last time.
Round and round we go!
Yeah, that person was supposed to be Ahmed Chalabi, at least that's who the Pentagon wanted. He has no credibility in Iraq, hasn't lived there in like 20-30 years, was even convicted of bank fraud in Jordan at one point, gave the US tons of "intelligence" about how many weapons Saddam had, and has a place on the Governing Council.
but we did so well in vietnam replacing governments!Quote:
Originally Posted by Eomer
france shoulda stuck it out instead :|
I meant Saddam.
We wern't replacing governments in Vietnam. The south wanted us there. In fact they were pissed when we abandoned them to the north.
I won't claim the U.S. will appoint the best person for the job. But its a safe bet they'll be better off when we're done.
If this is a reference to Iraq then you couldn't be more wrong. Saddam came to power through the Baathist party without the US's help. The US did not really have much to do with Saddam until the Iraq-Iran war where we did support Saddam to some degree. This was your classic balance of power scenario. As to the weapons, pay attention next time the history channel/CNN show the Iraqi military 1980-present. You will see a lot of destroyed T-72s, MiG 25s and a whole slew of AK-47s and SCUD missles. Most of Iraq's military hardware was Russian designed not American; which is why we suffered so few combat deaths.Quote:
Of course they do. They'll PUT him into power, finance him and supply him with weapons. Just like the last time.
That's not true Vid. The US has been playing political ends against each other in Iraq since 1966. You can look it up. This is from the Worldwatch Institute:
For half a century, the United States has made steadily increasing investments in keeping the Gulf region in its geopolitical orbit—and maintaining its claim on a preponderant share of the earth’s resources. The investments have included direct and indirect forms of intervention, massive arms transfers to allies, and the acquisition of military bases. The result has been a series of shifting alliances and repeated large-scale violence. In Washington’s calculus, securing oil supplies has consistently trumped the pursuit of human rights and democracy—a priority unchanged now that the Bush administration prepares for a more openly imperial role in the region.
Saudi Arabia has had a close relationship with the United States since the 1940s, once Washington recognized the country’s strategic importance. But the regime in Riyadh has long been vulnerable to pressures from the far more populous Iraq and Iran. Iran was brought firmly into the Western orbit by a 1953 CIA-engineered coup against the Mossadegh government, which had nationalized Iran’s oil. The coup re-installed the Shah on the Persian throne. Armed with modern weaponry by the United States and its allies, the Shah became the West’s regional policeman once the military forces of Britain—the former colonial power—were withdrawn from the Gulf area in 1971.
Iraq, on the other hand, was a pro-Western country until 1958, when its British-installed monarchy was overthrown. Fearing that Iraq might turn communist under the new military regime, the United States dabbled in a temporary alliance of convenience with the Ba’ath (Renaissance) Party in its efforts to grab power. CIA agents provided critical logistical information to the coup plotters and supplied lists with the names of hundreds of suspected Communists to be eliminated.
Even so, in 1972 the Ba’ath regime signed a treaty of friendship and cooperation with the Soviet Union. Baghdad turned to Moscow both for weapons and for help in deterring any U.S. reprisals against Iraq for nationalizing the Iraq Petroleum Company, which had been owned by Royal Dutch-Shell, BP, Exxon, Mobil, and the French firm CFP. Iraq was the first Gulf country to successfully nationalize its oil industry during the early 1970s struggle pitting oil exporting countries against the Western multinational corporations that had ruled the industry.
Saddam Hussein, a strongman of the Ba’ath regime who formally took over as President in 1979, was instrumental in orchestrating the pro-Moscow policy. But as it became apparent that the Soviet Union could not deliver the technologies and goods (both civilian and military) needed to modernize Iraq, he gradually shifted to a more pro-Western policy. Western governments and companies were eager to soak up the rising volume of petrodollars, and to lure Iraq out of the Soviet orbit. During the 1980s, this eagerness extended to supplying Baghdad with the ingredients needed to make biological, chemical, and nuclear weapons.
Washington's Pro-Iraqi Tilt
The year 1979 turned out to be a watershed, as the Shah of Iran was swept aside by an Islamic revolution that brought Ayatollah Khomeini to power. One of Washington’s main geopolitical pillars had crumbled, and the new regime in Teheran was seen as a mortal threat by the conservative Persian Gulf monarchies. The Carter administration responded by pumping rising quantities of weapons into Saudi Arabia, and began a quest for new military bases in the region (Bahrain eventually became the permanent home base for the U.S. Fifth Fleet). But there was no escaping the fact that neither Saudi Arabia nor any of the smaller Gulf states were strong enough to replace Iran as a proxy.
Instead, Iraq became a surrogate of sorts. Iran and Iraq had long been at loggerheads. Seeing a rival in revolutionary disarray, and sensing an opportunity for an easy victory that would propel him to leadership of the Arab world, Saddam Hussein invaded Iran in September 1980. Eager to see Teheran’s revolutionary regime reined in, the United States turned a blind eye to the aggression, opposing U.N. Security Council action on the matter.
But instead of speeding the Iranian regime toward collapse, the attack consolidated Khomeini’s power. And marshalling revolutionary fervor, Iran was soon turning the tide of battle. With the specter of an Iraqi defeat looming, the United States went much farther in its support of Saddam:
* To facilitate closer cooperation, the Reagan administration removed Iraq from a list of nations that it regarded as supporters of terrorism. Donald Rumsfeld, now secretary of defense, met with Saddam in Baghdad in December 1983. His visit paved the way to the restoration of formal diplomatic relations the following year, after a 17-year hiatus.
* The United States made available several billion dollars worth of commodity credits to Iraq to buy U.S. food, alleviating severe financial pressures that had threatened Baghdad with bankruptcy. The food purchases were a critical element in the regime’s attempts to shield the population as much as possible from the war’s repercussions—and hence limiting the likelihood of any challenges to its rule. The U.S. government also provided loan guarantees for an oil export pipeline through Jordan (replacing other export routes that had been blocked because of the war).
* Though not selling weapons directly to Iraq, Reagan administration officials allowed private U.S. arms dealers to sell Soviet-made weapons purchased in Eastern Europe to Iraq. U.S. leaders permitted Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, and Jordan to transfer U.S.-made weapons to Baghdad. And they abandoned earlier opposition to the delivery of French fighter jets and Exocet missiles (which were subsequently used against tankers transporting Iranian oil).
* From the spring of 1982 on, the Reagan administration secretly transmitted highly classified military intelligence—battlefront satellite images, intercepts of Iranian military communications, information on Iranian troop deployments—to Saddam Hussein’s regime, staving off its defeat.
* As the war went on, the United States took an increasingly active military role. It tilted toward Iraq in the “war on tankers” by protecting oil tankers in the southern Gulf against Iranian attacks, but did not provide security from Iraqi attacks for ships docking at Iran’s Kharg Island oil terminal. Later, the United States even launched attacks on Iran’s navy and Iranian offshore oil rigs.
Washington’s immediate objective was to prevent an Iranian victory. In a larger sense, though, U.S. policymakers were intent on keeping both Iraq and Iran bogged down in war, no matter how horrendous the human cost on both sides—hundreds of thousands were killed. (The Reagan administration secretly allowed Israel to ship several billion dollars worth of U.S. arms and spare parts to Iran.) Preoccupied with fighting one another, Baghdad and Teheran would be unable to challenge U.S. domination of the Gulf region. Reflecting administration sentiments, Henry Kissinger said in 1984 that “the ultimate American interest in the war [is] that both should lose.”
Oil and geopolitical interests translated into U.S. support for Saddam Hussein when he was at his most dangerous and murderous—not only committing an act of international aggression by invading Iran, but also by using chemical weapons against both Iranian soldiers and Iraqi Kurds. U.S. assistance to Baghdad was provided although top officials in Washington knew at the time that Iraq was using poison gas.
Undoubtedly, U.S. support emboldened Saddam Hussein to invade Kuwait in 1990. But he miscalculated badly: the United States would never consent to a single, potentially hostile, power gaining sway over the Gulf region’s massive oil resources. When its regional strongman crossed that line, U.S. policy shifted to direct military intervention.
Pumping Out Oil, Pumping in Arms
In the wake of Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait, Iraqi and Kuwaiti oil supplies were lost and oil prices spiked. Saudi Arabia calmed world oil markets by stepping up its production by close to 60 percent in 1989-91. Once more, the kingdom’s crucial role as swing producer, and Western dependence on Riyadh, was demonstrated.
Following the Gulf War of 1991, the United States supplied Saudi Arabia and allied Gulf states with massive amounts of highly sophisticated armaments. Washington and other suppliers delivered more than $100 billion worth of arms from 1990 to 2001. In the late 1980s, Saudi Arabia had imported 17 percent, by dollar value, of worldwide weapons sales to developing countries. In the 1990s, the Saudi share rose to 38 percent. The 1990s thus saw a complete reversal of earlier patterns, when first Iran and then Iraq were the prime arms recipients in the Gulf. (See Table 2.)
But rather than becoming independent military powers, Riyadh and the other Gulf states are at best beefed-up staging grounds for the U.S. military: Washington has for many years been “pre-positioning” military equipment and supplies and expanding logistics capabilities to facilitate any future intervention. And although political sensitivities rule out a visible, large-scale U.S. troop presence, more than 5,000 U.S. troops have been continuously deployed in Saudi Arabia, and more than 20,000 in the Gulf region as a whole.
Despite insinuations by the Bush administration, there is no evidence that Saddam Hussein’s regime is in any way linked to the events of September 11, 2001. However, the terrorist attacks facilitated a far more belligerent, unilateralist mood in Washington and set the stage for the Bush administration doctrine of pre-emptive war.
Installing a U.S. client regime in Baghdad would give American and British companies (ExxonMobil, Chevron-Texaco, Shell, and BP) a good shot at direct access to Iraqi oil for the first time in 30 years—a windfall worth hundreds of billions of dollars. And if a new regime rolls out the red carpet for the oil multinationals to return, it is possible that a broader wave of de-nationalization could sweep through the world’s oil industry, reversing the historic changes of the early 1970s. (See Table 3 for data on the leading private and state-owned oil companies.)
Rival oil interests were a crucial behind-the-scenes factor as the permanent members of the U.N. Security Council jockeyed over the wording of a new resolution intended to set the parameters for any action against Iraq. The French oil company TotalFinaElf has cultivated a special relationship with Iraq since the early 1970s. And along with Russian and Chinese companies, it has for years positioned itself to develop additional oil fields once U.N. sanctions are lifted.
But there were thinly veiled threats that these firms would be excluded from any future oil concessions unless Paris, Moscow, and Beijing support the Bush policy of regime change. Intent on constraining U.S. belligerence, France, Russia, and China nonetheless are eager to keep their options open in the event that a pro-U.S. regime is installed in Baghdad. In early November 2002, the Security Council adopted Resolution 1441. It is likely that backroom understandings among the Council’s major powers regarding the future of Iraqi oil were part of the political minuet that finally led to the resolution’s unanimous adoption.
There's more but I really need to get back to my school work. There's a lot more I could say about Iraq, Africa, and Nigerian oil specifically but seriously this thread is getting silly. Can you all just agree to disagree and go outside or read a book or something? :p
What's a book? You mean like a manual for a game?
Vini was that the article you meant to post? It supported my assertion rather then opposing it as your opening statement would seem to imply it should.
My main assertion was that Saddam was well entrenched in power before the US provided him any aid, which your article supports. The Ba'athists came to power in 1968 and was definitely not a US friend as your articles stateswhich is hardly the actions of "friendly" nations. Every "Western friendly" action listed in that article takes place AFTER Saddam had been a senior Ba'thist for nearly 24 (dating from the coup attempt in 56) years and already the absolute leader of Iraq.Quote:
Even so, in 1972 the Ba’ath regime signed a treaty of friendship and cooperation with the Soviet Union. Baghdad turned to Moscow both for weapons and for help in deterring any U.S. reprisals against Iraq for nationalizing the Iraq Petroleum Company..
My second asssertion was that eventual US assistance was the result of conflict with Iran as part of a balance of power strategy and your article once again supports this assertion.Mind you I never asserted that the US had no involvement in Iraq prior to the 1980s, I merely said we did not aid Saddams personal rise to power as MH had previously asserted. I would love to hear your thoughts on the matter rather then reading a cut-paste and run.Quote:
Washington’s immediate objective was to prevent an Iranian victory. In a larger sense, though, U.S. policymakers were intent on keeping both Iraq and Iran bogged down in war, no matter how horrendous the human cost on both sides—hundreds of thousands were killed.
osnap
Sorry Vid if I am too busy to capitulate to your conversational whim at this moment. I'm completely bogged down in other things. We can talk about this issue at some point in the future if you'd like. :p Right now I'm in the middle of translating Chaucer's Canterbury Tales, studying for a test in Classical Mythology (Hesiod and Aeschylus can be tedious to read even in the best translation), reading a ton for my linguistics class and getting ready for a study abroad this summer in Durban S. Africa.
You are not completely wrong on the US involvement with Saddam pre-1980s but there were attempts to sway him to our way of thinking in the 1970s. ;) There are some political theorists who assert that the CIA had direct involvement in putting Saddam into power in the Ba'ath party but I haven't seen much evidence for that assertion.
I guess I should have been more specific about what I was disagreeing with in your post, I meant to point out that the US has been giving Iraq weapons/technology for much longer than the 1980s in efforts to maintain control of our interests in the region. Sorry about that...
Now can you all get off this crazy topic and go do something more productive? :p
Yes, we supported the pre-Ba'athist monarchy. However I am not finding much information at all about the US supporting Iraq prior to the Iranian conflict. We didn't even have formal diplomatic relations with Iraq from 1967 to 1984. I just don't see how we could have officially supported the Ba'athists during that time period. Every source I investigate makes it absolutely clear that the normal situation between Ba'athis Iraq and the United States was a situation of distrust. This interview shows that the Iraqi government themselves felt that the United States was hostile to them and was actively working to undermine their regime before and after the Iranian conflict.
What this is supposed to mean I have no idea. Are you implying we bribed him with money/arms(a bad thing)? Are you saying we had a dialogue with him(a good thing)? In my limited searching I found no evidance for either.Quote:
You are not completely wrong on the US involvement with Saddam pre-1980s but there were attempts to sway him to our way of thinking in the 1970s.
Actaully I find such discussions productive. This is an election year where foreign policy will be a main concern after all. Though I guess it would be more productive for us to play more video games and watch more tv with our time instead.Quote:
Now can you all get off this crazy topic and go do something more productive?